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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this article is to briefly tackle, from a comparative 
viewpoint, an academically quite overlooked topic: techniques of 
enforcement of lawful judgments. Despite a gradual convergence in 
many fields of law, common and civil law jurisdictions still maintain 
a striking diversity in the ways in which they react to non-compli-
ance with court judgments. Whilst in common law tradition, failure 
to comply with a judicial order is considered civil contempt of court, 
in civil law countries this legal institution is simply unknown. Fur-
thermore, it is only in civil law systems that failure to comply with a 
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court judgment cannot be punished by imprisonment. My key ques-
tion is: what are, if any, the “cultural” reasons that could explain 
this divergence of approach? First, discussing Mauro Cappelletti’s 
comparative methodology, I explore whether, and to what extent, 
civil contempt of court and its civilian counterparts are comparable. 
Then, focusing my attention on the common law model, I argue that 
many contemporary features of civil contempt can only be fully un-
derstood by looking at the particular image and unique social per-
ception of the judge within the common law legal tradition. 
 
Keywords: enforcement of rights, contempt of court, comparative 
law methodology, comparative civil procedure, common law, civil 
law  
 
“ . . . ne pas regarder comme semblables des cas réellement diffé-
rents; et ne pas regarder manquer les différences de ceux qui pa-
roissent semblables.”1  –Montesquieu 
                                                                            
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, the comparative study of civil proce-
dure and, more specifically, that of the techniques of enforcement of 
legal judgments—a topic almost completely neglected in legal aca-
demia—has become of increasing importance.2 The reason under-
pinning this turn lies in the fact that legal scholars have become 
                                                                                                             
 1. Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, Préface to 2 DE L’ESPRIT DE LOIS 229 
(Roger Caillois ed., Gallimard 1951).  
 2. The starting “block” of this field of research can be found in the publica-
tion of the collection of essays titled TRENDS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-
MONEY JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS (Ulla Jacobson & Jack Jacob eds., Kluwer L. 
Intl. 1988). See also Konstantin D. Kerameus, Enforcement of Non-Money Judg-
ments and Orders in a Comparative Perspective, in LAW & JUSTICE IN A 
MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 107 (James 
AR. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., Transnational Publishers 2002); 
Konstantin D. Kerameus, Enforcement Proceedings, in XVI INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE 19 (Mauro Cappelletti 
ed., Brill 2002); Michael Chesterman, Contempt: in the Common Law, But Not in 
the Civil Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 521 (1997); Carlandrea Cremonini, An 
Italian Lawyer Looks at Civil Contempt: From Rome to Glastonbury, 3 CIV. JUST. 
Q. 133 (1984). Less recently, but still useful, Alexander Pekelis, Legal Techniques 
and Political Ideologies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 665 (1943).  
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more and more aware of the importance that all legal systems gov-
erned by the rule of law must provide some effective remedy to en-
force the rights that are provided by the substantive law itself. 
“Treaties are nothing but scraps of paper!”3 Indeed, the same 
could well be said for judicial decisions. Except for the cases in 
which judge’s statements have—as analytical philosophers would 
say—a “performative” effect,4 in the sense that they directly create 
or change a legal relationship (e.g., determining personal status, 
such as a divorce decree or annulment of marriage5), judgments cre-
ating obligations always demand acts of compliance. Self-evidently, 
this compliance is not always spontaneous. If it is not, the legal sys-
tem must find a way to win the not-surprising judgment debtor’s 
reluctance to comply with the pronouncement of the court, and to 
realize, therefore, what the famous Italian civil procedure scholar 
Giuseppe Chiovenda used to call “la volontà concreta della legge” 
(“the concrete will of the law”).6 From a more philosophical view-
point, it is a common claim that coercion is central to the very idea 
of law, and that coercive enforcement inevitably accompanies the 
concept of rule of law.7 
Technically speaking, while judgments requiring the defendant 
to pay a sum of money to the claimant simply involve the first being 
                                                                                                             
 3. This anecdotal phrase is said to have been exclaimed by German chan-
cellor T. Von Bethmann Hollweg, in relation to the Treaty of London, shortly 
before the World War I. 
 4. JOHN AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (Harv. U. Press 1962). 
More recently, see MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORLD IS OUR BOND: HOW 
LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (Stanford U. Press, 2014) and specifically chapter 1: How 
to Do Things with Law. 
 5. These types of judgments are defined “transformational” by FLEMING 
JAMES JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 (5th 
ed., Foundation Press 2001), or “self-effectuating” by ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, 
ZUCHKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE, 1096 (Oxford U. 
Press 2011), in the sense that they do not require enforcement proceedings (in 
Italian, sentenze costitutive; in French, jugement constitutive; in German, Gestal-
tungsurteile). 
 6. GIUSEPPE CHIOVENDA, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 249 
(Jovene 1960). 
 7. Recently, re-stressing this point, FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF 
LAW (Harv. U. Press 2015). 
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forcibly stripped of his assets to pay his debt, things get more com-
plicated in the case of non-monetary judgments, i.e., those judicial 
decisions that order the defendant to do, or to abstain from doing, a 
specific act (“orders of specific performance” and “prohibitory” or 
“mandatory injunctions”). In those cases, without an adequate appa-
ratus of coercive tools able to force human conduct, jurisdictional 
power—as it has been wryly noted—“would be an empty illusion.”8 
Before proceeding further, let me first define what I mean, 
broadly speaking, by “coercive tools” in civil proceedings. It is well-
known that the jurisprudential definition of a legal institution can 
take two forms: that of the function and that of the structure.9 From 
the former perspective, coercive sanctions are procedural tools that 
aim to oblige the judgment debtor (i.e., the party who has to give 
performance) without the intervention of the enforcement machin-
ery of the State with the judicial order. From the perspective of the 
structure, they act by inflicting monetary or even personal penalties 
(incarceration) on the claimant. In short, the rationale of coercive 
means is to make non-compliance with the judicial order less con-
venient than compliance. 
What I want to draw attention to in this article is that common 
and civil law jurisdictions—despite their undeniable gradual con-
vergence in many legal aspects10—still radically differ in the ways 
in which they react to non-compliance with court judgments. While 
in common law failure to comply with a binding legal decision or 
order is considered civil contempt of court, in civil law countries 
this concept is totally unknown. In the common law world, willful 
disobedience of court orders represents a sort of offence (as the word 
                                                                                                             
 8. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 216 (West 1974). 
 9. This dichotomy to define legal institutions is owed to the great Italian 
legal philosopher NORBERTO BOBBIO, DALLA STRUTTURA ALLA FUNZIONE. 
NUOVI STUDI DI TEORIA GENERALE DEL DIRITTO (Laterza 2014) (1977). 
 10. On this trend, see THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, 
FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Basil Markesinis ed., Oxford U. Press 1994). For a critical view, see Pierre 
Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L. AND COMP. L. 
Q. 52 (1996). 
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“contempt” literally indicates) against the court itself or the public 
administration and proper functioning of justice, and as such it has 
to be, in a certain sense, “punished.” This becomes clear especially 
if we look at the United States, where the line of demarcation be-
tween civil and criminal contempt is not so sharply drown. Con-
versely, in the civil law legal family, non-compliance is a matter of 
significance for the enforcing party only. Breach of civil orders is 
not considered a question of “public policy.” As it has been correctly 
pointed out, “to the non-common lawyer the contempt power is a 
legal technique which is not only unnecessary to a working legal 
system, but also violates basic philosophical approaches to the rela-
tions between government bodies and people.”11 
Undoubtedly, also civil law systems have some forms of sanc-
tion or threat to compel compliance with judges’ orders—the 
astreintes in France,12 the Geldstrafen in Germany,13 the “coercive 
measure” introduced for the first time in 2009 in the Italian Code of 
Civil Procedure,14 and so forth—but they are never regarded as ways 
                                                                                                             
 11. Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1 WASH. U. L. Q. 
1, 2 (1961). 
 12. Astreintes are notoriously court orders for the payment of a fine for each 
day the debtor delays compliance with the judgment. They are for the benefit of 
the creditor. This model has been transplanted—in Europe—in Luxemburg, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands. For the French model, see ANNE LEBORGNE, VOIES 
D’EXÉCUTION ET PROCÉDURES DE DISTRIBUTION 288 (Dalloz 2009); Astreinte, 
VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE (Gérard Cornu ed., Press Univ. France 2005). In Bel-
gium, see JACQUES VAN COMPERNOLLE & GEORGES DE LEVAL, L’ASTREINTE 
(Larcier 2007). 
 13. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] (Code of Civil Procedure) § 888, 890 (Ger.). 
The sum of money, unlike in the French model, is to be paid to the State (and not 
to the plaintiff). For an examination of this model, see, in German, OSCAR 
REMIEN, RECHTSVERWIRKLICHUNG DURCH ZWANGSGELD: VERGLEICH – 
VEREINHEITLICHUNG – KOLLISIONSRECHT (Mohr 1992). 
 14. Italian Code of Civil Procedure, article 614-bis. For an English-language 
overview, Elisabetta Silvestri, The Devil is in Details: Remarks on Italian En-
forcement Procedures, in ENFORCEMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY. TRADITION AND 
REFORM 207 (Remco van Rhee & Alain Uzelac eds., Intersentia 2010). In Italian-
language, Sergio Chiarloni, L’esecuzione indiretta ai sensi dell’art. 614 bis c.p.c.: 
confini e problemi, GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 731 (2014); for some comparative 
remarks, see also Michele Taruffo, Note sull’esecuzione degli obblighi di fare e 
di non fare, GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 744 (2014). 
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to “vindicate” the court’s authority or its dignity. Rather, as the his-
torical evolution shows, these kinds of coercive tools are simply de-
signed to overcome the Roman-Latin maxim “nemo precise ad fac-
tum cogi potest” (“nobody can be forced to do a specific act”15). 
Thus, in contractual matters, they guarantee the continental princi-
ple of the supremacy of specific performance over the obligation to 
pay damages.16 
Furthermore, in the continental legal tradition (France, Italy and 
Spain, for instance), it is not possible to commit the unwilling debtor 
to prison. In this respect, the German model is quite problematic as 
it had followed a slightly different trajectory. While refusing a “per-
sonalized” and non-bureaucratic concept of judge—as it is, on the 
contrary, in the common law tradition (see section V.)—in Ger-
many, imprisonment as a way of enforcement is theoretically still 
possible, although in very few and strictly limited cases, and only 
when the obligation is infongible or strictly personal (i.e., when it 
can be performed only by the debtor in person unvertretbare Hand-
lung). The reason of this enduring possibility has been discussed by 
historians of civil procedure. It probably represents a residual insti-
tution from the Middle Ages, and, in particular, from the fact that 
                                                                                                             
 15. This rule was embedded, for instance, in former article 1142 of the French 
Civil Code (before the 2016 reform of contractual obligations) (“toute obligations 
de faire ou de ne pas faire se résout en dommages et interêts en cas d’inexécution 
de la part du débiteur,” i.e., every obligation to do or not to do is converted in the 
obligation of paying damages in case of nonperformance). However, both in com-
mon and civil law tradition it is not possible to coerce the defendant into comply-
ing with orders that involve personal activities (like contracts of employment), 
such as “contracts of personal service.” See generally J. Lewis Parks, Equitable 
Relief in Contract Involving Personal Service, U. OF PA. L. REV., 251 (1918) or, 
in the French legal system, “obligations à caractère personnel,” see Antoine 
Lebois, Les obligations de faire à caractère personnel, JCP 2008, 210.  
 16. SOLENE ROWAN, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMANCE (Oxford U. 
Press 2012). A classic account of this topic is that of GUENTER H. TREITEL, 
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT (Oxford U. 
Press 1988). See also Shael Herman, Specific Performance: a Comparative Anal-
ysis, 7 EDINBURGH L. REV. 8 (2003). For an earlier, but still valid, analysis, John 
P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 516 
(1958).  
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the contumacy, in its broader sense, was then considered as an of-
fence to the authority of the king (Verletzung des Königs17).  
As the German model represents, in this hypothesis, an excep-
tion to the general rule adopted by civil law systems, it will not be 
taken into consideration here. Rather, what I want to stress, from a 
very general standpoint, is the fact that in civil law jurisdictions 
(with, indeed, the small exception of Germany, in some cases), 
courts lack the power to act in personam at all. Conversely, in com-
mon law countries, the imprisonment of the person found guilty of 
civil contempt seems to be a common practice, especially in the 
United States. The famous case of Beatty Chadwick is, to this extent, 
emblematic: here, an American lawyer was jailed for fourteen years 
in the county prison of Delaware only because he refused to disclose 
to the court his assets in a matrimonial proceeding, and it is surpris-
ing to note that he would have done less time in prison if he had 
simply stolen the money.18 
My key questions are: what are the reasons of this contrast? 
What are the cultural factors, if any, that are able to explain and jus-
tify this discrepancy of approaches? 
My article will unfold as follows. In the following part, I will 
outline the methodological framework of my research, recalling the 
                                                                                                             
 17. In German language, J. KOHLER, Ungehorsam und Vollstreckung im Zi-
vilprozess, ARCH. CIV. PRAX. 80, 141 (1893). For the historical analysis of this 
point, see the discussion occurred between the Italian procedural law scholars 
SERGIO CHIARLONI, MISURE COERCITIVE E TUTELA DEI DIRITTI 68, 72 (Giuffré 
1980) and Vittorio Colesanti, Misure coercitive e tutela dei diritti, RIVISTA DI 
DIRITTO PROCESSUALE 601 (1980).  
 18. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002). This case is discussed 
in detail by Mitchell J. Frank, Modern Odysseus of Classic Fraud—Fourteen 
Years in Prison for Civil Contempt Without a Jury Trial, Judicial Power Without 
Limitations, and an Examination of the Failure of Due Process, 66 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 599 (2012). See also, on this case, WENDY MCELROY, THE ART OF BEING 
FREE: POLITICS VERSUS EVERYMAN AND WOMAN 95 (Laissez Faire Books 2012). 
On a wider perspective, see Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Con-
tempt Confinement: The Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 185 (1991). To avoid these situations, now, in England, committal by a Su-
perior court may only be for a maximum of two years, and only one month if the 
order comes from an inferior court—Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.14(1). The 
superior court power to fine is, however, unlimited. 
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approach suggested by the Italian-American comparative law 
scholar Mauro Cappelletti (Part II). I will then explore what is the 
common function, or common need, which makes the comparison 
between the civil contempt of court and its civilian counterparts pos-
sible (Part III). Then, while focusing my attention upon the Anglo-
American model of civil contempt of court, I will illustrate its most 
distinctive features, contrasting them with the “continental” view 
(Part VI). Finally, I will argue that those differences can be fully 
explained only by looking at the different images and roles played 
by judges and courts in each legal tradition (Part V). As I see it, it is 
not possible to even partially understand the long-lasting presence 
and enduring importance of a legal institution such as the (civil) con-
tempt of court without taking into account the particular conception 
of the judiciary and the particular “symbolic image” and “social per-
ception” of the judge in the common law systems and, I would say, 
within the Anglo-American society at large.  
II. THE “COMPARABILITY” OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
Before addressing the problem shortly outlined above, I think it 
would be useful to premise some short methodological remarks in 
relation to the comparative law enterprise. 
In my view, one of the biggest problems—if not the biggest—
for comparative law scholars is to determine what can be usefully 
compared.19 By and large, comparative law is, in a certain sense, 
caught in middle of this paradox. On the one hand, it is necessary to 
respect differences existing between legal systems—without alter-
ity, the comparative law endeavor itself makes no sense.20 
                                                                                                             
 19. Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence: The 
Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 713, 720 (2004) [herein-
after Valcke, Comparability of Legal Systems]. See also Catherine Valcke, Re-
flections on Comparative Law Methodology—Getting Inside Contract Law, in 
PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, 22 (Maurice Adams & Jacco 
Bomhoff eds., Oxford U. Press 2012). 
 20. “Comment, d’ailleurs, le comparatiste lui-même pourrait-il exister sans 
l’autre?” wonders PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARÉ 96 (4th ed., Presses Uni-
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On the other hand, we unavoidably need a “contact point”—or, to 
use Pierre Legrand’s evocative expression, an “interface séman-
tique”21—for legal cultures to communicate with each other: 
“[l’]absolument autre ne pourrait être qu’indéchiffrable, c’est-à-
dire muet.”22 To make a dialogue, we must speak the same language. 
In short—as Catherine Valcke has summarized—comparative law, 
to be possible, requires unity and plurality at once.23 
But how is it possible to combine respect for alterity and the 
need for communication? How is it possible to reconcile both those 
fundamental and to a certain extent, at odds requirements? 
Although the literature relating to comparative law methodology 
is surprisingly huge (comparative law scholars seem to be somehow 
obsessed with methodological discussions24), I would like to em-
ploy and discuss here the methodological framework suggested by 
Mauro Cappelletti—one of the most prominent and internationally-
renowned voices of the last century, both in the field of comparative 
law and civil procedure—as outlined in his book about civil justice 
systems in comparative perspective.25 I think his method represents 
one of the best attempts to fruitfully handle this “tension” between 
similarity and difference.  
                                                                                                             
versitaires de France 2011). See also Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Her-
itage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 144 
(Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003), “[a] planet 
with one culture would be an impoverished habitat (and a world in which com-
paratists have very little to do).” 
 21. LEGRAND, supra note 20, at 77. 
 22. Id. at 73. 
 23. See Valcke, Comparability of Legal Systems, supra note 19, at 720. 
 24. For an up-to-date and thorough account, see COMPARATIVE LAW 
METHODOLOGY (Maurice Adams, Jaakko Husa & Marieke Oderkek eds., Edward 
Elgar Pub. 2017); MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge U. Press 
2014). A helpful critical summary (in French) is provided by Béatrice Jaluzot, 
Méthodologie du droit comparé: bilan et prospective, 57 REVUE INTERNATIONALE 
DE DROIT COMPARÉ 29 (2005). 
 25. I am referring to Mauro Cappelletti, Metodo e finalità degli studi com-
parativi sulla giustizia, in MAURO CAPPELLETTI, DIMENSIONI DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
NELLE SOCIETÀ CONTEMPORANEE: STUDI DI DIRITTO GIUDIZIARIO COMPARATO16 
(Il Mulino 1994). 
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To put it roughly, according to his view, two or more legal insti-
tutions can be said “comparable” (and the comparative law endeavor 
can be, thus, meaningful) not when the final legal solutions adopted 
by each country are similar, but when the problem or social need the 
normative intervention intended to address is the same. It is quite 
evident here the reference to the functional method, the main as-
sumption of which—as Zweigert and Kötz famously wrote—is that 
“in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill 
the same function.”26 
Attempting to bring unity to comparative law research, Mauro 
Cappelletti’s first assumption is that before comparing, we first need 
to find out what is the shared social problem or need legal institu-
tions aim to respond. Secondly, in his desire to insist on differences, 
he explicitly states how a purely technical description of a legal state 
of affairs between two or more foreign countries does not mean 
comparative law. Comparative law in its most authentic sense al-
ways involves an in-depth research of historical, sociological, ethi-
cal, ideological (in one word: cultural) reasons that can somehow 
explain the divergence of legal solutions, and everyone sees how 
these reasons can only be found outside the strict legal domain.27  
Admittedly, this kind of methodology also has a weak part. In-
deed, the final stage of the comparative research is said to consist in 
an assessment of the different legal solutions in terms of efficiency. 
                                                                                                             
 26. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 34 (Oxford U. Press 1998). For a critical discussion, Ralph Michaels, The 
Functional Method of Comparative Law in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Ox-
ford U. Press 2006); Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 144 (Pierre 
Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003). Recently, on func-
tionalism, see James Gordley, Comparison, Law, and Culture: A Response to 
Pierre Legrand, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 133 (2017) (special issue: What We Write 
About When We Write About Comparative Law: Pierre Legrand’s Critique in Dis-
cussion). 
 27. Cappelletti, supra note 25, at 17–18. Those elements are dubbed the “in-
visible forces” by Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Pattern of Order in 
Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L. 
J. 291 (2003). 
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Since this claim can no longer be accepted—as it has been proven 
wrong by the most recent comparative law scholarship, and by the 
notion of “incommensurability” of legal traditions28—my goal in 
this article is not to say which model of coercive sanction (the civil 
law or the common law one) is the best. I think that both have their 
advantages and drawbacks. For one thing, continental models are 
too “soft,” and could in fact lead to the “monetization” of all entitle-
ments. On the contrary, the common law system could repress vari-
ous kinds of legitimate revendications in order to preserve the legal 
status quo—as it happened in those cases in which the English and 
American judiciary, through the threat of contempt of court, pre-
vented or stopped picketing and striking by trade unions in industrial 
disputes.29 Rather, I want to simply analyze and give value to the 
existing enriching cultural distance between common and civil law 
traditions in this academically quite overlooked legal field. 
III. IN SEARCH OF THE COMMON NEED: THE PRINCIPLE OF 
EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
In the case of coercive sanctions in civil proceedings, it is not 
difficult to see what their core function is. Basically, it is to convert 
judges’ words into facts. By preventing that court decisions will not 
be followed by actions, coercive sanctions enforce the “rule of law,” 
generally understood as the supremacy of the law (in the case here 
at stake, as embodied in a binding legal judgment) over the personal 
will of people.30 
                                                                                                             
 28. H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?, 49 AM. J. OF 
COMP. L. 133 (2001).  
 29. This matter is discussed in JOHN A.G GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE 
JUDICIARY 63 (5th ed., Fontana Press 1997); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & 
NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (Macmillan 1930) and William E. 
Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 
(1989). 
 30. See, e.g., Sherry v. Gunning [2014] IEHC 411 (H. Ct.) (Ir.): “The juris-
diction of the courts to enforce their own orders is an essential aspect of the rule 
of law;” United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta (A.G.) [1992] 1 S.C.R., 901 at 931 
(Can.):  
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In a more detailed way, the task of all coercive tools is to en-
hance the so called principle of “effective judicial protection.” This 
principle is not only provided now, in Europe, by art. 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights—which generally protects 
the right of a fair trial—but it is also a general rule which is part of 
the very foundation of any system ruled by law.31 In the narrow 
sense and for my current purposes, this principle means, amid many 
other things, that every legal order must provide effective means to 
enforcing its judgments (especially non-pecuniary ones) and that the 
remedies that courts deliver must be effective. All this has been 
clearly stated by the European Court of Human Rights for the first 
time in its path-breaking decision Hornsby v. Greece.32 In this case, 
Greek authorities refused to give the permission to two British citi-
zens to open up an English language school because they did not 
have Greek nationality. The Greek Supreme Administrative Court 
held that this refusal was contrary to the European Law, which pre-
vents nationality-based discriminations, and finally ordered to grant 
the “specific remedy” (i.e., the permission to open up the school). 
However, Greek administrative officials did not comply with this 
order, and the British citizens were then only awarded damages, i.e. 
a sum of money for their actual loss. The European Court of Human 
                                                                                                             
The rule of law is at the heart of our society; without it, there can be 
neither peace, nor order, nor good government. The rule of law is directly 
dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and main-
tain their dignity and respect. To maintain their process and respect, 
courts since the 12th century have exercised the power to punish for con-
tempt of court. 
 31. See Anthony Arnull, The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU 
Law, An Unruly Horse?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 51 (2011). 
 32. Hornsby v. Greece, App. No. 18357/91, 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R 613. For a 
discussion of this case, GERANNE LAUTENBACH, THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF 
LAW AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 146 (Oxford U. Press 2013). 
On the rising of a real right to an effective judicial enforcement of binding 
judgments, in French language, Jacques Normand, L’émergence d’un droit euro-
péen de l’exécution, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE JACQUES VAN 
COMPERNOLLE 458 (Bruylant 2004); Jacques Van Compernolle, Le droit à l’exé-
cution: une nouvelle garantie du procès équitable, in LE DROIT PROCESSUEL ET 
JUDICIAIRE EUROPÉEN 475 (Georges De Leval & Marcel Storme eds., La Charte 
2003). 
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Rights then condemned Greece on the basis that Article 6 of the 
Convention requires final judgments to be exactly enforced. The 
Court persuasively argued that the right of access to court “would 
be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a 
final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detri-
ment of one party”33 and more importantly that the “action for dam-
ages” provided by Greek statutory legislation “cannot be deemed 
sufficient to remedy the applicants’ complaints” as “compensation 
for non-pecuniary damage . . . would not have been an alternative 
solution.”34 Here, the mere monetary compensation was found to be 
a qualitatively inadequate remedy compared to the specific relief.  
I think it is quite clear that, especially after this judicial decision, 
all coercive procedural devices are expected to play a crucial and 
unique role in every contemporary legal system. They are, in some 
ways, necessary. Without them, as Calabresi and Melamed stressed 
in their influential study, “property rules” granted by law would be 
converted into mere “liability rules” if the defendant can only be 
forced to pay a “substituted” sum of money for having failed to com-
ply with his/her primary duty.35 If things were so, we could say that 
the right to disobey a non-monetary judgment is obtainable by the 
mere payment of a monetary penalty.36 It is worth noting, inci-
dentally, that this is what always happened in Italy before the ulti-
mate introduction of the general coercive tool in 2009 in the Code 
of Civil Procedure, especially in the case of judgments ordering the 
abstention from doing something or ordering an activity that could 
be done only by the defendant in person (i.e., infongible). 
                                                                                                             
 33. Hornsby v. Greece, supra note 32, at para. 40. 
 34. Id. at para. 37. 
 35. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1126 
(1972): “we impose criminal sanctions as a means of deterring future attempts to 
convert property rules into liability rules.” 
 36. “The right to disobey the law is not obtainable by the payment of a penalty 
….” Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1984] 2 All ER 408 at 412 
(UK). 
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IV. CIVIL CONTEMPT OF COURT AND THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC DIVIDE  
After having tackled the problem of the comparability between 
civil contempt of court and the continental coercive tools, I would 
like now to stress the divergences existing between the two, and try 
to explain them.  
Coherently with the approach initially adopted and focusing on 
the Anglo-American model, I will leave apart the most technical as-
pects as well as the examination of procedural requirements or of 
operating rules of civil contempt of court, and I will explore its es-
sential characteristics, its fundamental principles, and its most “ide-
ological” or “political” features. Indeed, contempt of court has to be 
essentially seen, at least in my opinion, as an ideologically loaded 
notion. 
To begin, it is well-known that the purpose of civil contempt of 
court (or contempt in procedure, or contempt by disobedience) is to 
provide a sanction for non-compliance of theoretically any court or-
der (interlocutory or provisional as well final, for the discovery or 
production of documents, as well on the merit of the case), not only 
by means of monetary penalties (i.e., sequestration of assets and 
fines), but even through the incarceration of the contemnor.37 This 
possibility derives from the fact that all equity instruments (and in 
particular orders of specific performance, and mandatory and pro-
hibitory injunctions, that in ancient times only the Lord Chancellor 
                                                                                                             
 37. Civil contempt of court is a legal institution that exists in every common 
law jurisdiction. For monographic accounts focusing on the English model, see 
DAVID EADY & A.T.H. SMITH, ARLIDGE, EADY & SMITH ON CONTEMPT 892 (4th 
ed., Sweet and Maxwell 2011); C. JOHN MILLER, CONTEMPT OF COURT (3d ed., 
Clarendon Press 2000); NIGEL LOWE & BRENDA SUFRIN, THE LAW OF CONTEMPT 
(3d ed., Butterworths 1996); Contempt of Court, in 22 HALSBURY’S LAW OF 
ENGLAND (5th ed., Adrian Zuckerman ed. 2012). For the analysis of some dis-
tinctive aspects of civil contempt in the United States, see Paul A. Grote, Purging 
Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2011); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Con-
tempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000); Earl C. Dudley, Getting Beyond the 
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Con-
tempt, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1993). 
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could grant), do not act in rem (i.e., against assets), but in personam 
(i.e., directly against the debtor’s person). 
“A court without contempt power is not a court.”38 I think this 
short phrase perfectly captures the main feature of the English civil 
sanction, a feature that does not exist in civil law jurisdictions at all. 
It expresses the very idea that the contempt power (both in its civil 
and criminal form) is so innate in the concept of jurisdictional au-
thority that a court that could not secure compliance with its own 
judgments and orders is a contradiction in terms, an “oxymoron.” 
Contempt power is something regarded as intrinsic to the notion of 
court; even obvious, I would say. In the common lawyer’s eye, the 
power of contempt “is inherent in courts, and automatically exists 
by its very nature.”39 
The legal origins of the contempt of court are well rooted in his-
tory.40 In R. v. Almon, judge Wilmot wrote: “I have examined very 
carefully to see if I could find out any vestiges or traces of its intro-
duction, but can find none. It is as ancient as any other part of the 
common law, there is no priority or posteriority to be discovered 
about it.”41 Of course, such a statement must be understood as part 
of that broad, now debunked, “narrative” aiming to affirm that com-
mon law has always existed, and that the English judge do not in-
vent, but rather find out and declare pre-existing laws (that is the so 
called “declaratory theory”). Nevertheless, in this case there is some 
truth. Yet in the very first essay on common law, the Tractatus de 
legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (the famous Tractatus of 
Glanville), there is a reference to the contemptus curiae, i.e., the dis-
regard of the party who failed to appear before the King’s court, or 
his justices (Curia Regis).42 
                                                                                                             
 38. Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a 
Hodgepodge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337, 342 (1998). 
 39. Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 16. 
 40. On contempt of court history, see SIR JOHN CHARLES FOX, THE HISTORY 
OF CONTEMPT OF COURT. THE FORM OF TRIAL AND THE MODE OF PUNISHMENT 
(Oxford U. Press 1927). 
 41. R. v. Almon 97 E.R. 94; (1765) Wilm 243. 
 42. EADY & SMITH, supra note 37, at 1. 
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Historically speaking, and in more detail, the contempt power 
can be further explained by the development and stabilization of the 
notion of “inherent jurisdiction” of English Superior Courts, a con-
cept completely extraneous to the habits of thought of civil lawyers, 
academically educated in the shadow of the dogma of the strict sep-
aration of powers. By inherent jurisdiction I mean that “reserve or 
fund of powers,” without statutory foundation, “which the court may 
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so” in 
order to preserve their own authoritativeness.43 It follows that to af-
firm that civil contempt of court is mainly serving the plaintiff in-
terest means to profoundly misunderstand the real nature of this in-
stitution. The main value here protected remains that of the “due 
administration” of justice: “civil contempt cannot be considered 
therefore merely as a means by which individuals litigants can en-
force orders in their favour.”44 
Common law judges often use the concept of “public policy” to 
indicate this strong public interest toward the punishment of non-
compliance with their orders. As Lord Diplock clearly wrote in his 
decision Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., there is al-
ways “an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since 
the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of 
any court could be disregarded with impunity.”45  
In the common lawyer’s legal mentality, the presence of civil 
contempt of court is then fundamental to the maintenance of social 
order and its hypothetical elimination is often depicted in rather 
apocalyptical (and often irrational) ways:  
 
                                                                                                             
 43. These words are those of Isaac H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 23, 51 (1970). Now also in ISAAC H. 
JACOB, THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW 221 (Sweet and Maxwell 1982). 
More recently, on this issue, Martin S. Dockray, The Inherent Jurisdiction to Reg-
ulate Civil Proceedings, 113 L. Q. REV. 120 (1997). 
 44. EADY & SMITH, supra note 37, at 893. 
 45. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1973] 3 All ER 54, 71. For 
similar considerations, Mid Bedfordshire District Council v. Brown (Thomas), 
[2004] EWCA Civ. 1709 [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1460. 
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To allow court orders to be disobeyed—a Canadian judges 
argued—would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the 
orders of Courts can be treated with disrespect, the whole 
administration of justice is brought into scorn . . . . Loss of 
respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction 
of our society.46 
As a result, throughout all the common law world, the distinction 
itself between civil and criminal contempt is much hazier than civil 
lawyers may think.47 In Jennison v. Backer,48 Judge Solomon stated 
that the purpose of vindicating the right of the claimant and the pur-
pose of vindicating the court authority are “inextricably intermixed” 
and that the divide between the two forms of contempt is “unhelpful 
and almost meaningless.” For Lord Donaldson, in Attorney-General 
v. Newspaper Publishing Ltd.,49 that distinction even “tends to mis-
lead rather to assist.” Furthermore, as one of the most authoritative 
American books on injunctions says: “contempt are neither wholly 
civil nor altogether criminal.”50 
That means that the nature of civil contempt of court is always 
twofold. It has both a coercive and punitive function at once.51 
                                                                                                             
 46. O’Leary J., Canada Metal Co. Ltd vs. Canadian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion, [1975] 48 D.L.R. 3d 649, 669. (quoted in Chesterman, supra note 2, at 521). 
See also Sherry v. Gunning, supra note 30: “The orders of the court must be com-
plied with. The alternative is anarchy in which the strong will triumph over the 
weak.” 
 47. “The demarcation [between civil and criminal contempt] may be hazy at 
best,” File v. File, 673 S.E. 2d 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
 48. Jennison v. Backer [1972] 2 Q.B. 52, [1972] 1 All ER 997. 
 49. Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing Ltd. [1987] 3 All ER 276, 294 
(CA). 
 50. OWEN FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 832 (2d ed., Foundation 
Press 1984). 
 51. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). More 
recently, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 
(1994) (“contempt is a civil-criminal hodgepodge”); on this important case, see 
Philip A. Hostak, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Par-
adigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 CORNELL 
L. REV. 181 (1995); Linda Mullenix, Clarifying the Distinction between Civil and 
Criminal Contempt: Problems of Prospective Penalties and Excessive Fines, 3 
Preview of Supreme Court Cases 87 (University of Texas Law, Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 360, 1993): “Elements of punitive as well remedial punishment 
are almost invariably present in every civil contempt.” Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 
759, 764 (Alaska 1971) (quoting Grote, supra note 37, at 1256 n.71). 
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In other words, one could say that the purpose of civil contempt of 
court, in most cases, is both backward-looking (used to punish past 
acts of disobedience) and forward-looking (used to compel obedi-
ence). It always has a “punitive” flavour. For these reasons civil con-
tempt is often said to be a “quasi-criminal” wrong, and to “partake 
of a criminal nature.”52 It coherently follows, for example, that the 
standard of proof is the criminal one of “beyond any reasonable 
doubt” and not the civil one of “balance of probabilities.”  
What it should be emphasized here is that such affirmations 
would be simply unthinkable in a civil law jurisdiction, where pri-
vate and criminal (public) law are understood as two legal fields well 
separated and never overlapping and that is why, for instance, civil 
law courts cannot award punitive damages.53 In the civil law legal 
culture, unlike in the common law one, the distinction between what 
counts as (private) tort and what counts as (public) crime has always 
been quite sharply drawn.54 
Yet from these brief observations it is therefore possible to un-
veil the profound difference between civil contempt of court and its 
civilian counterparts. Indeed, the idea that non-compliance with 
court orders represents, in some ways, a public offence toward the 
court is simply foreign to civil law scholar’s eye. As Alexander 
Pekelis (an Italian-American civil procedural scholar of the last cen-
tury) remarked: 
This very concept of contempt simply does not belong to the 
world of ideas of a Latin lawyer. It just does not occur to him 
                                                                                                             
 52. In re Bramblevale Ltd, [1970] 1 ch. 128 (C.A.), per Lord Denning, M.R. 
at. 137. 
 53. On this comparison, Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Mid-
dleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. J. 1795, 1804 (1992). 
Recently, this issue has been investigated from a comparative perspective by 
Marco Cappelletti, Punitive Damages and the Public/Private Distinction: A Com-
parison Between the United States and Italy, 32 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 799 
(2015). See also Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages–A European Perspective, 68 
LA L. REV. 741 (2008). 
 54. For an analysis of the historical roots of such a difference, David J. Seipp, 
The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 BUFFALO 
U. L. REV. 59 (1996).  
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that the refusal of the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff a 
painting sold to the latter . . . may, as soon as judicial order 
is issued, become a matter to a certain extent personal to the 
court, and that the court may feel hurt, insulted, “con-
temned,” because its order has been neglected or willfully 
disobeyed.55 
Now, no doubt that in contemporary times, Anglo-American 
judges do not feel personally “offended” or “insulted” by the 
debtor’s non-compliance with its orders. But nonetheless it is true 
that only in civil law countries, what happens after the final judg-
ment is conceived as a mere chose des parties (i.e., a private matter 
between the parties) and do not involve the judicial authority in its 
essence. 
V. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES: TWO REMARKS ABOUT THE 
IMAGE OF THE COMMON LAW JUDGE 
My claim is that it is possible to fully understand the nature and 
character of civil contempt of court only by looking at the high so-
cial prestige of the judiciary in the common law jurisdictions, vis-à-
vis civil law jurisdictions.56 In the words of Konstantinos Kera-
meus—one of the few procedural legal scholars that has dealt with 
the enforcement proceedings in comparative perspective—the re-
gime of civil contempt “transcends the field of the enforcement by 
… exalting the function of courts within society at large.”57  
I believe, in other words, that there is a sort of correspondence, 
a connection, or at least an influence, between the, so to say, “zero 
tolerance” for disobedience with judicial orders (well expressed by 
the civil contempt of court doctrine) and the symbolic image, or the 
“social perception,” of common law judges. Basically, while in 
common law jurisdictions judges are characterized by a high social 
                                                                                                             
 55. Pekelis, supra note 2, at 668; Chesterman, supra note 2, at 541. 
 56. This idea is not totally new; see, e.g., GILLES CUNIBERTI, Grands sys-
tèmes de droit contemporains 124 (2d ed., L.G.D.J. 2011): “[l]a stature du juge 
anglais n’est peut-être pas étrangère au développement d’une institution propre 
aux droits de Common law sanctionnant la désobéissance aux ordres judiciaires.”   
 57. Kerameus, supra note 2, at 117.  
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prestige, and the judiciary function is strongly “personalized,”58 on 
the contrary, in continental legal culture, judges are essentially seen 
as de-personalized, anonymous, bureaucratic figures that com-
pletely lack that “paternal authority” that characterizes their com-
mon law counterparts. 
Although this point merits a deeper reflection, which goes be-
yond the scope of this article, I think that at least two kinds of his-
torical justification can be advanced. The first is, I would say, “in-
stitutional.” It deals with the fact that, in England, the authority of 
the judiciary is historically derived from the Sovereign’s powers. I 
am aware that this is, in some ways, true also in relation to the civil 
law jurisdictions, at least at the beginning of their evolution. But 
whilst the recent developments of the continental legal culture are 
marked by a complete rupture with the previous legal order, due es-
pecially to the French Revolution and its strongly “anti-judicial” 
ideology, in England there is no a real, commonly-recognized 
boundary between the Middle Ages and modern times—it is well-
known that the gradual development of common law is better de-
scribed by the idea of “continuity” than that of “separation.”59  
In late Anglo-Saxon times, the King was described as the foun-
tain of all justice. According to the famous Blackstone’s metaphor, 
                                                                                                             
 58. This feature is well exemplified, for instance, by the fact that, in common 
law legal culture, the style in which legal decisions are written (their “aesthetic”) 
is rich and strongly “recognizable” (think emblematically of Lord Denning’s 
opening lines, like the famous one in Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40 at 42: “It 
happened on April 19, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent,” and in many other 
judgments). Besides, each common law judge in the decision-making process ex-
presses themselves in the first person, and is entitled to write their dissenting or 
concurring opinion—to clearly stress how the reasoning is to be intended as the 
product of their own mind and nothing else. In contrast, a French sentence is short, 
written in a highly technical and “impersonal” jargon that completely lacks any 
rhetorical force or literal beauty. Here the message implicitly conveyed is that it 
is neither a person nor a group of people speaking, but just the invisible will of 
the law, which has no face. On this topic, see Mitchel Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Por-
traits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1326 (1995); 
for a more general discourse, see MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (Oxford U. Press 
2004). 
 59. NICOLA PICARDI, LA GIURISDIZIONE ALL’ALBA DEL TERZO MILLENNIO 53, 
61 (Giuffrè 2007). 
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jurisdiction was lake water: “[t]he course of justice flows from the 
King in large streams. As those streams run through his courts, jus-
tice is subdivided into smaller channels . . . till the whole and every 
part of the kingdom were plentifully watered and refreshed.”60 Sov-
ereigns themselves could take part personally in their own courts. In 
this picture, the King delegated his power to carry out justice to 
judge, that they were nothing but the “impersonification” of the Sov-
ereign in the realm. Although only in a symbolic way, all this can be 
seen still today. The High Court is Her Majesty’s High Court. The 
Law Courts, i.e., the London building that houses the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal, is called the Royal Courts of Justice. The 
judges are Her Majesty’s judges.61 In the United Kingdom, all juris-
diction still formally derives from the Crown, and justice is carried 
out in its name.62 In such a legal context, it was quite clear that dis-
regard towards judges meant disregard toward the King himself, and 
to disobey equity orders issued by the Lord Chancellor (who was 
dubbed as the “keeper of the King’s conscience”) meant nothing but 
an indirect disobedience to the Monarch.63  
On the contrary, in civil law countries, coercive measures have 
developed only as means of guaranteeing the specific performance 
(exécution en nature in French, Naturalherstellung in German, 
esecuzione in natura in Italian) of every obligation—a principle that 
descends from the “natural law” and moral maxim “pacta sunt 
                                                                                                             
 60. These words are quoted by Paul D. Halliday, Blackstone’s King, in RE-
INTERPRETING BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: A SEMINAL TEXT ON NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 175 (Wilfred Prest ed., Oxford U. Press 2014).  
 61. JACK JACOB, THE FABRIC OF ENGLISH CIVIL JUSTICE 205 (Sweet & Max-
well 1987). 
 62. The official website of the Royal Family still mentions this; 
see https://perma.cc/K5RS-XZHV. 
 63. Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 8 (“[t]he courts of early England acted for the 
king through the realm. And their exercise of contempt powers derived from a 
presumed contempt of king’s authority”). This point is highlighted also by John 
H. Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161, 162 
(1908); remembering that, during the case of the committal of Prince Henry for 
contempt, the Chief Justice Gascoyn said, “I keep here the place of the king, your 
sovereign lord and father, to whom ye owe double obedience.” 
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servanda” (literally translated: promises must be kept) and that tra-
ditionally do not belong to the common law legal tradition, at least 
in the field of contract law.64 
The second observation, in terms of “political theology,” has to 
do with the religious derivation of all legal professions and of the 
community of jurists as an élite in the common law world. Indeed, 
at least until late in the Middle Ages, the King of England was 
named as the “earthly living image of Christ” or “Vicar of God.”65 
It is no surprise, therefore, if those features were transferred from 
the Sovereign to judges, who still remain today—in the mode of 
thought of the common law lawyer—the “priests” of justice (com-
mon law scholars often think of judges in theological terms).66 The 
implied syllogism was this: if the Monarch represents the image of 
God on earth, and judges represent the King, then people have to 
obey judges as they somehow represent God.67 Moreover, until the 
16th century, the Lord Chancellor, who exercised jurisdiction in civil 
                                                                                                             
 64. “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you 
must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else” is the famous phrase 
owed to Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 472 
(1897). 
 65. In the Italian legal scholarship, this topic has been thoroughly explored 
by CRISTINA COSTANTINI, LA LEGGE E IL TEMPIO. STORIA COMPARATA DELLA 
GIUSTIZIA INGLESE (Carocci 2007). The appellation of “Vicar of God” of early 
Norman kings, as well its influence of the discipline of contempt are underlined 
by Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 7. 
 66. See Philip Soper, Metaphor and Models of Law: The Judge as a Priest, 
75 MICH. L. REV. 1196, 1209 (1977). See also Larry C. Backer, Retaining Judicial 
Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 12 WM & MARY 
BILL RTS J. 117 (2003) (quoting Lewis H. LaRue, How Not To Imitate John Mar-
shall, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 836 (1999): “Judges are priest, not proph-
ets”). See also PAUL RAFFIELD, IMAGES AND CULTURES OF LAW IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL POWER 1558–1660 7 (Cambridge U. 
Press 2004), where the judicial function is dubbed secular priesthood. Judicial 
function has been defined as secular papacy by Ronald Dworkin, The Secular 
Papacy, in JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERSATION 79 (J. Stephen Breyer & Robert Badinter eds., NYU Press 2004). 
JOHN P. DAWSON, Introduction to THE ORACLE OF LAW at xi (U. of Mich. Press 
1967) speaks of a “mythic aura of sanctity” of judges. 
 67. For this line of reasoning, see David Marrani, Confronting the Symbolic 
Position of the Judge in Western European Legal Traditions: A Comparative Es-
say, 3 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2010). 
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matter, had always been a high ecclesiastic dignitary, and his proce-
dural devices and techniques were those used in ecclesiastical 
courts. 
On the contrary, in civil law jurisdictions, judges are no longer 
seen as “cultural heroes or parental figures” as “their image is that 
of a civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative 
functions.”68 
In relation to the civil contempt of court, all that has been said 
can be perceived from the highly revelatory point of view of the lan-
guage. Words such as “disobedience,” “purging” (i.e., that sort of 
confession of guiltiness, where the wrongdoer must admit before the 
court his misconduct, acknowledge the breach of the order, express 
his regret and show a “suitable remorse”69), “debarment” (i.e., the 
formal exclusion of the contemnor from the legal proceeding), all 
evoke concepts such as “sin” and “redemption,” that seem more 
strongly to belong to the religious sphere (or to that of the “father-
son” relationship), than to the field of the administration of justice.70  
To this extent, John Merryman, one of the most foremost Amer-
ican comparative law scholars, and learned expert of civil law sys-
tems, in specifically assessing the absence of the civil contempt of 
court in the continental systems, lucidly wrote that the parties, in the 
common law legal proceedings, play out their role before the         
“father-judge,” and that the whole procedure is “permeated by a 
                                                                                                             
 68. JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE 
AND LATIN AMERICA 37 (Stanford U. Press 2007) (1969). 
 69. Catherine O’Regan, Contempt of Court and the Enforcement of the Labor 
Injunctions, 54 MOD. L. REV. 385, 397 (1991). For the need of a “suitable re-
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he just disobeyed—a term that for a Latin lawyer’s ear is likely to suggest 
a parent-child relation, rather than a court-party relation—he has diso-
beyed the court, he has been a bad boy, and he has to stand in the corner 
until he changes his mind. Nothing mysterious about it! 
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moralistic flavour”—and of course the Protestant ethic may have 
played a great role in this.71  
On the contrary, in the civil law legal tradition, given that the 
judge merely is “an important public servant, but he lacks anything 
like measure of authority and paternal character possessed by the 
common law judge,” parties and witnesses “can disobey his orders 
with less fear of serious reprisal.” This is because the civil law legal 
culture is “thoroughly secularized, less moralistic, and more im-
mune to the ethic of the time and place.”72 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, my article aimed at demonstrating how civil con-
tempt of court is an institution that cannot exist but in the common 
law legal tradition, and that its presence in common law jurisdic-
tions, and conversely its absence in civil law countries, is totally un-
derstandable. Civil contempt is to be understood as a by-product, 
historically determined, of a particular and unique fashion to con-
ceive and consider the function of the judge and its position within 
the legal system. In common law legal orders, the judge has always 
been at the center of the legal experience, and there is no surprise 
that his judgments and orders are so intensely protected. While in 
the civil law culture the judge is merely conceived as an impersonal 
institution applying pre-existing laws, in the common law tradition 
he has been the creator of legal rules, conceived therefore as a real 
person, whose pronouncements and orders prompted the advance-
ment and development of the law. The disobedience of his words 
was therefore a disobedience, and thus a contempt, directed to his 
persona: 
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Dans l’imaginaire de common law, la justice est le fait d’une 
personne plutôt que d’une institution. C’est pourquoi la per-
sonnalisation de la fonction judiciaire semble infiniment 
plus importante que sur le continent, où la justice se conçoit 
plutôt comme une administration. L’unité de référence n’est 
pas la même : un individu dans un cas, une institution, dans 
l’autre […] La théorie positiviste, révolutionnaire et antiju-
diciaire conçoit le juge comme un automate; elle lui refuse 
toute contribution personnelle à la création du droit […] 
Pour la common law, la justice procède d’une décision ren-
due par un homme.73  
This excerpt, in my opinion, perfectly sums up why in the com-
mon law legal tradition failure to comply with judicial decisions is 
a quasi-criminal wrong, sanctioned even by imprisonment. 
Overall, on a more general scale, my short analysis aimed at 
drawing attention to the fact that, in comparative endeavors, we have 
to focus not only on the points of convergence between legal insti-
tutions but, most importantly, on those of divergence, especially in 
the field of civil procedure and dispute resolution mechanisms, 
where legal tools are—more than anywhere else—deeply influenced 
by historical and cultural conditions. Cultural distance is, indeed, 
something that should be praised, not eliminated. Cultural distance 
is an enriching component of comparative research that empowers 
our mutual understanding of law and legal institutions, and as such 
it should be emphasized, rather than underestimated or avoided, and 
explained, rather than taken for granted. This is, I think, the true 
mission of comparative scholars: “valoriser la singularité juridique 
. . . travailler avec acharnement à l’entendement du singulier,” and, 
at the same time, “refuser . . . la comparaison musarde, mécaniste, 
calculatrice, affairiste,” always bearing in mind that “la comparai-
son des droits sera culturelle ou ne sera pas.”74 
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